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Stress Testing Under Dodd-Frank: Easing the
Regulatory Burden for Midsized Financial Companies
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (“the Crisis”), the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”) was enacted to ensure that the catastrophic
loss of jobs and savings caused by the Crisis would not reoccur.1 One of
the tools Dodd-Frank provided to accomplish this goal is the requirement
that financial companies undergo periodic “stress testing” to determine
whether they have enough capital to remain solvent during sudden
economic downturns.2
Though Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing (“DFAST”) has
stimulated increased preparedness and transparency in the companies
subject to the tests, DFAST may impose a disproportionate burden on
financial companies that have between $10 and $50 billion in total
consolidated assets (“midsize companies”).3 Consequently, alterations to
testing may be necessary to increase DFAST’s efficiency, while
maintaining the goal of ensuring economic stability. 4 DFAST’s primary
flaws are: (1) it unfairly subjects midsize companies, with little potential

1. Presidential Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 [hereinafter Presidential Remarks] (July 21,
2010).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2012). Under the statute, financial companies include bank
holding companies and banks. See Dodd-Frank § 165(i)(2)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(2)(A)
(requiring nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors and bank
holding companies to conduct semi-annual stress tests, while requiring all other federally
regulated financial companies with consolidated assets over $10 billion to conduct annual
stress tests).
3. See Evan Sparks, Dodd-Frank Stress Tests a ‘Culture Shock’ for Mid-Sized Banks,
ABA BANKING J. (Oct. 26, 2015), http://bankingjournal.aba.com/2015/10/dodd-frank-stresstests-a-culture-shock-for-mid-sized-banks/ (looking at how difficult it is for some midsize
companies to handle the compliance costs of DFAST but also acknowledging how much
DFAST has helped stabilize and improve companies)
4. See id. (examining how difficult it is for some midsize companies to handle the
compliance costs of DFASTS but also acknowledging how much DFAST has helped stabilize
and improve banks).
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for macroeconomic impact, to its compliance costs; (2) it does not reward
companies for performing well on previous DFAST cycles; and (3) it fails
to ensure that financial companies are tested in a manner that reflects the
particular risks they present to the market.5
In light of these deficiencies, this Note suggests adjusting the
threshold criteria that subject a financial institution to DFAST and
stratifying midsize financial companies into tiers that correspond to each
company’s risk profile to determine how frequently a company will
undergo stress testing.6 The suggested changes discussed in this Note
would not interfere with DFAST’s goal of ensuring that the economy is
prepared for another sudden economic downturn, while optimizing the
rigor of the tests for midsize companies.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides an overview of
the characteristics of the midsize companies currently subject to DFAST,
how DFAST works, and what it requires of midsize companies.7 Part III
identifies flaws in the current system and examines how they are
damaging to midsize companies.8 Part IV recognizes the benefits that
DFAST provides, despite the flaws in the testing framework.9 Part V
demonstrates how implementing a tiered classification system and
changing the DFAST classification range would remedy the current
inefficiencies and excessive costs associated with DFAST. 10 Part VI
concludes by emphasizing the importance of stress testing and the
essential changes needed to improve the system.11

5. See Press Release, Reg’l Bank Coal., Sixty-Two Mid-Size and Regional Banks Write
in Support of Shelby Systemic Risk Legislation, (May 18, 2015),
http://regionalbanks.org/news/2015/05/sixty-two-mid-size-and-regional-banks-write-insupport-of-shelby-systemic-risk-legislation/ (expressing the anger of the midsize bank
community for being subject to DFAST when they are not “systemically” significant); see
also Adam Mustafa, 5 Takeaways From Midsize Stress Tests, BANKING EXCH. (Sept. 8, 2015,
7:21 PM), http://www.bankingexchange.com/news-feed/item/5730-5-takeaways-from-midsize-stress-tests (detailing how it is clear from the first round of testing for midsize companies
that they are not adequately tailoring the tests to their idiosyncratic risks).
6. See infra Part V.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Part VI.
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II. A PROFILE OF MIDSIZE COMPANIES: ANNUAL STRESS TESTING
REQUIREMENTS AND SCENARIOS
A.

Characteristics of Midsize Companies

Although midsize financial companies have a much smaller
impact on the nation’s economy than large financial companies (“large
companies” or “SIFIs”), they are key actors in the economy, especially in
smaller communities.12 Typically, midsize companies are established in
towns and small cities as stand-alone banks, and, as they grow, remain
dedicated to providing banking services to their immediate communities
and regions.13 When compared with large financial companies, midsize
companies generally engage in less risky or speculative banking
activities.14
The Federal Reserve Board (“the Fed”) holds midsize companies
to lower DFAST standards than large companies.15 Midsize companies
are deemed less systemically significant than large companies, which are
“so large, leveraged, and interconnected that their failure could pose a
risk to [the country’s] overall financial stability.”16 Accordingly, current

12. See, e.g., About, MID-SIZE BANK COAL. OF AM. http://midsizebanks.com/about/ (last
visited Jan. 10, 2016) [hereinafter MID-SIZE BANK COAL OF AM.] (explaining the focus on
local communities that midsize companies have had and how important they are to those
communities). “Large companies” or “systemically important financial institutions”
(“SIFIs”) are banks or bank holding companies that possess $50 billion in consolidated assets
or more. Systemically Important Financial Institutions and the Dodd-Frank Act: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Inst.’s and Consumer Credit, H. Comm. on Fin. Serv.’s,
112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Michael S. Gibson, Director, Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation) [hereinafter Gibson].
13. MID-SIZE BANK COAL. OF AM., supra note 12.
14. See Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5 (“These sixty-two institutions that serve Main
Street have joined together to make one thing clear: their business models look nothing like
those on Wall Street, and they shouldn’t be regulated like Wall Street either.”); see also Robert
G. Wilmers, Small Banks, Big Banks, Giant Differences, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 13, 2011),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-06-13/small-banks-big-banks-giantdifferences-robert-g-wilmers (examining the differences in how the largest banks and smaller
banks conduct business and the highly speculative trading that the largest banks participate
in).
15. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd Frank”)
§ 165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2012) (detailing how midsize companies are held to less
stringent DFAST requirements, especially in the number of annual DFAST cycles); see also
CHARYN FAENZA, STRESS TESTING FOR MID-SIZED BANKS, SAS INST.,
support.sas.com/resources/papers/proceedings15/3478-2015.pdf (discussing the technical
differences in testing and testing expectations between large and midsize companies).
16. Gibson, supra note 12, at 1.
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DFAST rules require large financial companies to participate in an annual
supervisory stress test conducted by the Fed in conjunction with the
company’s supervisory agency17—midsize companies, however, do not
have a supervisory test requirement.18 Large financial companies are
obligated to conduct two annual company-run stress tests, whereas
midsize financial companies are only required to conduct one companyrun stress test.19
The difference in systemic importance, and the rationale for
different DFAST treatment, is clear after comparing the percentage of
assets managed by large financial companies and the assets managed by
smaller financial companies.20 While large financial companies hold
approximately eighty percent of assets in the banking industry, all
financial companies that have under $50 billion in assets—not just the
midsize companies— manage roughly twenty percent of the assets.21
Though financial companies that have less than $50 billion in assets hold
only a sliver of the total banking assets in the United States, they provide
half of the banking services used on “Main Street.”22 These “Main
Street” banking services, which include taking deposits, lending to
businesses in the local community, and providing financing to single
families acquiring homes, are basic services crucial to local communities
and considered less speculative than many of the large financial
companies’ activities.23

17. For instance, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY, WHO
REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
5 (Dec. 8, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40249.pdf.
18. Dodd-Frank § 165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i).
19. Id.
20. See THE FED. RESERVE BD., INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT
HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE, RANKED BY CONSOLIDATED
ASSETS (June 30, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/#content
(ranking commercial banks by asset size and demonstrating how much bigger the banks at the
top are relative to the other banks); see also MID-SIZE BANK COAL. OF AM., supra note 12
(detailing the disparity between assets banks with over $50 billion control and the assets all
other banks control).
21. See Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis Is
Inevitable,
FORBES
(Jan.
8,
2013,
6:26
PM)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/01/08/five-years-after-the-financialmeltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big-sharks/#66aef1535474 (looking at the risky and
speculative activities big banks are involved in).
22. MID-SIZE BANK COAL. OF AM., supra note 12.
23. Id.
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Stress Testing for Midsize Companies

DFAST rules attempt to account for the differences in the overall
risks posed by midsize and large companies.24 Unlike large companies,
midsize companies are exempt from supervisory tests and are subject to
fewer annual tests.25 In addition to being subject to fewer total tests on
an annual basis (one, compared to three), specific aspects within DFAST
differentiate midsize and large companies.26 Compared to large
companies, there are lower expectations for midsize companies in their
company-run tests in terms of level of detail required in their reporting,
data segmentation, sophistication of their estimation practices, and public
disclosures.27
For example, DFAST currently requires midsize
companies to submit an annual report with approximately “100 line items
per scenario,” while large companies are required to submit reports with
nearly “2,500 line items per scenario.”28 Accordingly, the company-run
stress testing process for large companies is decisively more extensive
than it is for midsize companies.29
Midsize companies evaluate themselves under three scenarios in
company-run stress tests: baseline, adverse, and severely adverse. 30 Each
economic scenario includes manipulation of variables, including
“economic activity, unemployment, exchange rates, prices, incomes, and
interest rates.”31 The “adverse” and “severely adverse” test scenarios
attempt to categorize the strength and resilience of financial institutions
in hypothetical adverse economic climates.32

24. See FAENZA, supra note 15, at 2–4 (explaining the testing differences between
midsize and large companies, with large companies having more DFAST requirements).
25. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (explaining the testing differences between midsize and large
companies with large companies having more DFAST requirements); see also FAENZA, supra
note 15, at 2–4.
26. FAENZA, supra note 15, at 2–4.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 3.
29. See id. at 2 (“The regulators clearly state that their expectations for mid-sized banks
are not the same as their expectations for the large banks.”).
30. Dodd-Frank § 165(i)(1)(B)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(1)(B)(i).
31. OFFICE OF THE COMP. CURRENCY, Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (Company-Run),
http://www.occ.gov/tools-forms/forms/bank-operations/stress-test-reporting.html
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2016).
32. Id. For example, “adverse and severely adverse scenarios describe hypothetical sets
of events designed to assess the strength of banking organizations and their resilience.” Press
Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System (Jan. 28, 2016),
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Midsize companies are expected to not only use the adverse
economic scenarios designed by the Fed, but also to add scenarios that
reflect the specific risks they face.33 In their guidance for midsize bank
stress testing, the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation stated, “[a] company’s stress
testing framework should include activities and exercises that are tailored
to, and sufficiently capture, the company’s exposures, activities, and
risks.”34
This language demonstrates that regulators expect
customization of company-run stress tests to reflect the particularized
risks that each institution poses to the economy. 35
Unlike large company stress testing, there is no formal
declaration of whether a midsize bank passed or failed DFAST.36
However, “regulators will likely consider a firm’s stress test processes
and results when evaluating proposed actions that impact the firm’s
capital, including but not limited to: M&A transactions; [d]ividend
payments; and [r]edemptions of regulatory capital instruments.”37 This
means that if companies do not properly tailor the tests or they return
unsatisfactory results, regulators could restrict the company’s
transactions and dividends they return to shareholders, which would have
a significant impact on the company’s outlook.38
Preparing and performing well on DFAST each year is not a walk
in the park.39 At least initially, most companies need to enlist the services
of third-party vendors to build forecast models for the DFAST

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20160128a.htm.
These scenarios
typically include the manipulation of variables such as, raised unemployment, and different
degrees of recession and deflation. Id.
33. Mustafa, supra note 5.
34. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF
STRESS
TEST
SCENARIOS
3,
(Apr.
30,
2014),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-5360.html (detailing the timeline for
midsize DFAST compliance and the differences between midsize and large company
compliance).
35. Id.
36. Dodd-Frank Stress Tests for Mid-sized Banking Organizations, GOLDMAN, SACHS &
CO.
&
DAVIS
POLK
&
WARDELL
LLP
(Oct.
16,
2013),
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/DoddFrank.Stress.Tests_.for_.Mid_.Sized_.Banking.Organizations.pdf.
37. Id.
38. See id. (detailing the potential consequences that poor performance on DFAST brings
midsize companies).
39. See Sparks, supra note 3 (emphasizing the extensive business collaboration,
contracting, and time that DFAST compliance requires).
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scenarios.40 These vendors allow institutions access to statisticians,
economists, and model developers that assist in the DFAST compliance
process.41 Hiring this kind of outside help is a costly endeavor, because
DFAST “requires collaboration from across the institution.”42 However,
perhaps the most significant DFAST compliance cost is the amount of
company time that is required to ensure compliance.43 Senior member of
the House Financial Services Committee Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA) asserted
that with Dodd-Frank we “have a situation where for every employee
who is helping a customer, [we] have 1.2 man hours spent on
compliance.”44 This is a huge burden for midsize banks that do not have
the personnel of larger companies, but still have to dedicate a significant
amount of their workers’ time to compliance.45 Both the monetary costs
and the costs in time imposed by DFAST significantly drain midsize
companies’ resources.46
III. DEFECTS IN THE DFAST FRAMEWORK AND THE CONSEQUENTIAL
BURDENS THEY IMPOSE ON MIDSIZE COMPANIES
A.

DFAST’s Disincentive to Growth and the Damage of its
Arbitrary Asset Threshold

A critical failure of the current DFAST system is the imposition
of the arbitrary $10 billion to $50 billion asset range that classifies
companies as “midsize.”47 The implementation of arbitrary ranges is a
well-intentioned effort to avoid a “one size fits all” approach to banking
regulation.48 However, DFAST is too broad and does not properly
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rising Regulatory Compliance Costs and Their Impact on the Health of Small
Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit 5, 112th Cong. 112-122 (May 9, 2012) (statement from Ed Royce).
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see Sparks, supra note 3 (emphasizing that preparation for DFAST should begin
a year and a half in advance).
47. See Peter Cherpack, Act Fast to Raise Midsize Banks’ Asset Threshold, AM. BANKER,
July 22, 2015 http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/act-fast-to-raise-mid-sized-banksasset-threshold-1075569-1.html (detailing the negative effect that the $10 billion DFAST
threshold has on organic growth for those banks just below $10 billion in assets and the need
for DFAST that corresponds to risk profile).
48. Id.
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classify midsize companies according to the risks they present to the
economy in the event of a recession.49 DFAST’s arbitrary range
discourages banks from pursuing organic growth and forces high
compliance costs on truly non-systemically significant companies.50
Because of DFAST, companies hovering just below the $10 billion asset
threshold are hesitant to increase their assets.51 These smaller companies
fear that the compliance costs they would incur by growing, such as
gathering and maintaining complex data systems and hiring outside
consultants, would completely offset the benefits of such growth.52
As an example, National Penn Bancshares (“National Penn”), a
bank with just under $10 billion in assets, tried to acquire smaller banks
in order to have sufficient economies of scale to weather new DFAST
costs.53 The impetus behind these efforts was National Penn’s fear that
the bank could not handle the increased regulatory burden of preparing
for DFAST.54 When it could not find a satisfactory deal, the National
Penn shareholders voted to sell to Branch Banking and Trust Corporation
(“BB&T”),55 as it could not handle the increased compliance costs as it
organically grew over the $10 billion threshold.56
Karla Payne, Chief Financial Officer of Arvest Bank—a bank
nearing the DFAST range—experienced firsthand the incredible
challenges facing banks that are growing over the $10 billion threshold,
not just in terms of money, but also time.57 Payne recommends that banks
hovering near the $10 billion threshold initiate preparations a year and a
half in advance of the intended crossing.58 These length preparations are
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Evan Weinberger, BB&T’s Latest Deal Could Mark Uptick in Bank M&A, LAW

360 (Aug. 18, 2015, 8:55 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/692269/bb-t-s-latest-dealcould-mark-uptick-in-bank-m-a (examining the decision of National Penn Bancshares of
choosing to be acquired instead of growing organically and facing DFAST costs).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. BB&T is a North Carolina based SIFI with approximately $200 billion in assets.
BB&T
Corporation,
IBANKNET
(last
updated
June
12,
2015),
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/getbank.aspx?ibnid=usa_1074156.
56. See Weinberger, supra note 51.
57. Sparks, supra note 3. Arvest is an Arkansas based bank with $15.8 billion in assets
that operates much like a network of community banks in Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and
Missouri. See About, ARVEST BANK, https://www.arvest.com/about [hereinafter ARVEST
BANK] (highlighting the history, operations and geographic focus of Arvest Bank).
58. Sparks, supra note 3.
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necessary for a midsize company to address the challenges of
consolidating the necessary data required to perform DFAST.59 Included
in the data preparation is the extremely high cost of hiring outside
companies to build, and implement, the models for testing.60
The asset range currently in place under DFAST imposes high
compliance costs on smaller midsize financial companies, which fail to
correspond to their respective risk profiles.61 Furthermore, decisionmaking, previously focused on business risk and strategic opportunities,
has shifted to whether decisions to grow will result in an increased
regulatory burden that renders the growth unprofitable.62 These
compliance costs, consequently, discourage growth by impeding
profitability for an entire segment of financial companies.63 DFAST’s
current range could benefit from reformulation in order to remove
artificial barriers to growth and ensure that smaller banks can focus on
serving their communities, rather than on the costly burden of complying
with stress tests.64
B.

An Effectively Homogeneous Test and the Lack of Consideration
for Companies’ Risk Profiles

The most significant deficiency in the DFAST framework is the
lack of testing variation within the given midsize range, despite federal
regulators’ efforts to the contrary.65 DFAST should reflect a high degree
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Evan Weinberger, Midsize Bank Stress Tests May Spur More Regulatory Relief,

LAW360 (June 12, 2015, 6:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/667228/midsize-bankstress-tests-may-spur-more-regulatory-relief (discussing how industry professionals believe
stress testing may not be necessary for smaller banks and how DFAST becomes more
necessary when companies are engaged in risky activities).
62. See Weinberger, BB&T’s Latest Deal Could Mark Uptick in Bank M&A, supra note
51 (examining the importance of increased compliance costs under DFAST and how that
plays into institutions’ decisions).
63. See Cherpack, supra note 47 (detailing how the current range discourages growth for
institutions nearing $10 billion in assets).
64. See Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5 (highlighting how the current DFAST format
forces compliance costs on midsize companies that force them to divert resources from the
communities they serve to compliance); see also Cherpack, supra note 47 (discussing how
increasing the asset range for DFAST will likely encourage companies nearing $10 billion in
assets to grow, because fewer compliance costs would come with that growth).
65. See Mustafa, supra note 45 (identifying the lack of accounting for idiosyncratic risk
as one of the primary failures of the first round of publicly reported DFAST results for midsize
companies).
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of particularity to ensure that companies are prepared for adverse
economic events that affect their unique operations, and the specific risks
they pose to the economy.66 Instead of tailoring tests to companies’
unique risk profiles, as is required by the Fed, the majority of midsize
companies have relied solely on the Fed’s boilerplate scenarios and failed
to account for their own unique risks.67
It is possible that, because 2015 was the first year of mandated
public disclosure of DFAST results for midsize financial companies,
those companies were not consciously trying to skirt their responsibilities
by doing a poor job customizing the tests, but were simply confused about
their obligations.68 Nonetheless, it is clear that the requirements under
DFAST are not being followed in the way that the Fed intended.69 The
ultimate effect of this deficiency, whether inadvertent or purposeful, is
that midsize companies are being subject to an inefficient, relatively
uniform standard when midsize companies differ greatly in their
operations and the risks they pose to the economy.70 The benefits of such
a situation are decidedly less than a properly tailored standard.
In 2014, forty-two bank holding companies, twenty-eight
national banks and federal thrifts, nineteen state-chartered nonmember
banks, and ten state-chartered member banks completed the mandatory
company-run tests for midsize companies.71 It is unrealistic to believe
that Arvest Bank, a nearly $16 billion state-chartered bank, which
operates much like a network of community banks in four states, poses
the same risk to the national economy as City National Bank, a national
bank with around $35 billion in assets that provides banking services

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Michelle Sullivan & Colette Wagner, Life in DFAST Lane: Lessons Learned

From Midsize Banks’ First Stress Tests, CROWE HORWATH (Aug. 2014),
http://www.crowehorwath.com/ContentDetails.aspx?id=9133 (detailing lessons learned from
first publicly disclosed DFAST results for midsize companies including confusion from
applying the wrong test parameters); Mustafa, supra note 5.
69. See Sullivan & Wagner, supra note 68 (highlighting the confusion about DFAST
requirements for midsize companies and how some midsize companies applied the large
company guidance to their own tests); Mustafa, supra note 5.
70. See generally Mustafa, supra note 5 (highlighting the problem of most midsize
companies preparing the same way for DFAST and not accounting for idiosyncratic risk).
71. Initial Company-Run Stress Tests for Midsized Banks Completed, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF CLEVELAND, https://www.clevelandfed.org/banking-oversight/financial-systemsupervisors/regulation-and-guidance/initial-company-run-stress-tests-for-midsized-bankscompleted.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
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throughout the country.72 Under the current framework, institutions such
as Arvest Bank and City National Bank will have similarly burdensome
compliance costs, in terms of percentage of their operating budgets,
despite the institutions posing vastly different risks to the national
economy.73
Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo, the central bank’s head of
regulatory issues, agrees that there is not enough variation in DFAST’s
current format and believes that if DFAST is to continue for companies
outside of SIFIs, enhanced variation is needed to reflect the risk the
activities of financial companies poses.74 Though midsize companies are
engaged in variety of activities, even speculative activities at times, only
when midsize companies engage in riskier practices is heightened
regulatory scrutiny justified.75
The fact that DFAST has failed to effectively account for midsize
companies’ risk profiles is worrisome for both midsize companies that do
not need as much testing, and their customers who want their banks to
devote time and resources to them, instead of compliance.76 Because
midsize companies generally provide vital services to smaller regions and
have relatively fewer resources than the larger banks,77 spending beyond
what their risk profiles demand is profoundly damaging to the many
communities that rely on midsize companies for credit and various other
financial services.78 Accordingly, the current DFAST framework is an
inefficient use of banking industry resources, and as a result, could
benefit from alteration.79

72. Compare ARVEST BANK, supra, note 57 (detailing the basic operations of Arvest
Bank) with Company Overview, CITY NAT’L BANK, https://www.cnb.com/about/companyoverview.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2016) (detailing the basic operations and asset size of City
National Bank).
73. See Mustafa, supra note 5 (highlighting the fact that midsize companies did not
properly tailor DFAST and therefore likely prepared in similar ways, incurring similar costs).
74. See Weinberger, Midsize Bank Stress Tests May Spur More Regulatory Relief, supra
note 60 (detailing Tarullo’s belief that tests need to be “tailor[ed] more to [banks’] models”
or eliminated completely and that companies engaged in riskier activities should endure more
regulatory scrutiny).
75. Id.
76. Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5.
77. MID-SIZE BANK COAL. OF AM., supra note 12.
78. See Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5.
79. See id.
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IV. THE BENEFITS OF MIDSIZE COMPANY STRESS TESTING
Although DFAST’s current framework may be flawed and create
many unnecessary compliance obstacles for midsize companies, the goal
of encouraging stability within companies of all sizes is important for the
financial industry.80 Midsize companies, though not individually
systemically significant like their larger counterparts, are also affected by
strained economic conditions.81 Compared to midsize companies, the
potential failure of a SIFI would have a more expansive effect on the
national economy, but the collapse of midsize companies would have
devastating localized impacts in the communities and regions in which
they operate.82
The benefits and importance of DFAST for midsize companies
are clear from the perspective of many industry professionals. 83 For
example, Blake Coules, Chief Risk Officer for First-Citizens Bank,84 a
Raleigh, NC, bank with nearly $30 billion in assets, although concerned
about regulatory costs, asserts that stress testing is an important and
worthwhile exercise for midsize companies.85 The cost of conducting the
stress tests was substantial for First Citizens Bank, but Coules believes
the tests ultimately increased their stability, internal data sources and
modeling, and their chances of financial success moving forward. 86
Like Coules, Vince Calabrese, the CFO of First National Bank
Corporation, recognizes the positive aspects of DFAST.87 Calabrese
believes that DFAST is important because it promotes important
80. Telephone Interview with Blake R. Coules, Exec. Vice President & Chief Risk
Officer, First Citizens Bank (Sept. 11, 2015); see also Sparks, supra note 3.
81. See Weinberger, supra note 61 (“Small and midsize banks still have risks and they
still fail - just as much if not more than the big banks.”).
82. See id. (“Small and midsize banks still have risks and they still fail - just as much if
not more than the big banks.”); see also MID-SIZE BANK COAL. OF AM., supra note 12
(discussing the vital role midsize companies play in local communities).
83. Telephone Interview with Blake R. Coules, supra note 80; see also Sparks, supra
note 3 (detailing the positive effects that DFAST has had from the perspective of Vince
Calabrese, CFO of F.N.B. Corporation).
84. First-Citizens
Bank
&
Trust
Company,
IBANKNET,
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/getbank.aspx?ibnid=usa_491224 (last updated
Oct. 30, 2015) (giving basic financial details on First Citizens, including asset size). First
Citizens is a midsize North Carolina-based bank with nearly $31 billion in assets. Id.
85. Telephone Interview with Blake R. Coules, supra note 80.
86. Id.
87. Sparks, supra note 3. F.N.B. Corporation is a midsize bank approaching $20 billion
in total assets. Id.
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collaboration across departments in the pursuit of the organizational goal
of increased preparedness for future economic downturns.88 He further
emphasizes that the increased confidence in the company’s economic
health, that strong performance in DFAST elicits, is important for
shareholders as well as company executives.89
Though the current DFAST framework imposes significant
compliance burdens on non-systemically significant midsize companies,
it ensures that institutions, both large and midsize, are better prepared for
financial downturns.90 A new testing structure should balance the
benefits of increased transparency and preparedness with the burden
posed by compliance costs to midsize companies, ensuring that such
institutions are able to focus more resources on serving their communities
and customers.91
V. MOVING DFAST FORWARD: A PROPOSAL TO ADJUST THE ASSET
THRESHOLD FOR MIDSIZE COMPANIES AND ACCOUNT FOR RISK PROFILE
AND PAST PERFORMANCE
A.

A Needed Increase in Asset Threshold

The goal of DFAST is admirable and it certainly helps prepare
the financial industry for future economic downturns.92 However,
DFAST’s costs could be brought more into balance with its benefits.93
DFAST’s testing of companies with $10 billion to $50 billion in assets
unjustifiably imposes high compliance costs—the implementation of
which greatly discourages profitability and growth—warranting an
overhaul.94
One step toward fixing the system can be accomplished by simply
adjusting the asset range upwards.95 Senate Banking Committee

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Blake R. Coules, supra note 80.
Id.
Id.
See Sparks, supra note 3 (looking at how difficult it is for some midsize companies
to handle the compliance costs of DFAST but also acknowledging how much DFAST has
helped stabilize and improve banks);
94. Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5.
95. See Yalman Onaran, Shelby’s Bill Could Free 25 Midsize Banks From Stress Test,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 15, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
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Chairman Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL) recognizes deficiencies in the
current range, and has introduced a bill that would raise the minimum
amount of assets for SIFI categorization from $50 billion to $500
billion.96 Though this would delight the banking industry and free many
banks from the undesirable SIFI classification, it is far too extreme to be
implemented.97 Shelby’s proposed $500 billion threshold would only
classify the six largest banks as SIFIs even though those six are not the
only institutions that deserve the SIFI classification. 98 The $500 billion
threshold would exempt companies such as New York Mellon Corp.,
U.S. Bancorp, and Capital One, all of which are national in reach, and
seem to have definitive importance in the national economy. 99 In addition
to the proposed $500 billion threshold being too high, Shelby’s bill
practically ignores the smallest companies that are currently subject to
DFAST.100
An approach to reforming DFAST’s range, that would provide
relief to the smallest institutions subject to testing, would be to double
both ends of the range. Such a measure would increase the threshold for
automatically qualifying as a SIFI from $50 billion to $100 billion, and
would increase the bottom-end threshold from $10 billion to $20
billion.101 Also, though Shelby’s bill provides for an increase in SIFI
range that is too aggressive, it contains a provision that would allow the
Fed to designate companies with over $50 billion as SIFIs. 102 The
05-15/shelby-s-bill-could-free-25-mid-size-u-s-banks-from-stress-test (supporting the idea of
adjusting asset thresholds in DFAST to reduce regulatory burdens).
96. See id. (examining Shelby’s bill that proposes a vast increase in SIFI threshold and
the effect it could have on stress testing of banks).
97. See id. (discussing Shelby’s bill but acknowledging opposition from democrats to the
$500 billion level and that analysts believe that setting the new range at $500 billion is
unlikely).
98. See id. (detailing the seemingly systemically significant large companies that would
be free of SIFI classification under Shelby’s bill).
99. See id.
100. See id. (examining how only the upper threshold will be effected by the proposed
legislation); see also Press Release, Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5 (emphasizing the small
impact and risk to the economy that midsize companies have).
101. See generally Weinberger, supra note 61 (supporting the idea that banks under $100
billion in assets should have DFAST requirements eliminated or have the tests tailored to fit
their profiles).
102. See Paul H. Kupiec, At Long Last A Compromise on Dodd-Frank Reform, AM.
BANKER, May 20, 2015 at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/the-shelby-bill-is-asensible-compromise-on-dodd-frank-reform-1074432-1.html (looking at the specifics and
benefits of Shelby’s proposal, including the benefits of raising the standard for automatic SIFI
qualification).
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adoption of a similar discretionary provision is endorsed by this Note’s
proposal as a means of affording the Fed regulatory flexibility that will
allow it to adapt quicker to changing market conditions.103 This Note’s
proposal also asserts that companies in the $50 billion to $100 billion
range should not automatically qualify as SIFIs. 104 But, if the Financial
Stability Oversight Council determines that companies’ activities warrant
increased regulation, it should have the ability to impose SIFI regulation
Despite their lesser classification,
requirements accordingly.105
companies of that size can pose a range of risks to the economy—thus,
the flexibility provided by this discretion is key. 106
At first glance, while the increase from $10 billion to $20 billion
seems insignificant and arbitrary, this change would exempt over fifty
percent of the midsize companies currently subject to DFAST. 107 This
modest increase would alleviate DFAST’s burden on smaller midsize
companies, which have an overall miniscule share of the nation’s
economy, and allow these community-driven banks to not only focus
more on their customers, but also grow without fear.108

103. See id. (supporting the provision of Shelby’s bill that allows regulators’ discretion to
judge whether certain companies over $50 billion in assets warrant increased regulatory
supervision).
104. See id. (“[A] $50 billion bank holding company is nowhere near systemically
important.”).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. To arrive at over fifty percent, I obtained rankings (current as of Sept. 30, 2015) by
assets of bank holding companies, banks, thrifts, and credit unions. I then calculated the
number of companies within the $10 – $20 billion range that would no longer be subject to
DFAST under this Note’s proposal and divided it by the total number of companies that would
be tested under the current scheme (47/84=55%). The numbers used may not reflect the banks
that have actually been through DFAST as these asset totals are current through September
2015 and DFAST results were solicited and released earlier in 2015. Reports of Leading
Domestic
Financial/Bank
Holding
Companies,
iBanknet,
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/fiList.aspx?type=fry9 (last visited Feb. 12,
2016);
Financial
Reports
of
Leading
Banks,
iBanknet,
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/fiList.aspx?type=031 (last visited Feb. 12,
2016);
Financial
Reports
of
Leading
Thrifts,
iBanknet,
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/fiList.aspx?type=ots (last visited Feb. 12, 2016);
Financial
Reports
of
Leading
Credit
Unions,
iBanknet,
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/fiList.aspx?type=ncua (last visited Feb. 12,
2016).
108. Id; see also Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5.
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Current DFAST
($10 billion – $50
billion for
“midsize
companies”, and
above $50 billion
for “SIFIs” or
“large
companies”)109

This Note’s
Proposal ($20
billion – $100
billion for
“midsize
companies”, and
above $100
billion for
“SIFIs” or “large
companies”)

84

54

Shelby’s
Proposal ($10
billion – $500
billion for
“midsize
companies”,
and above
$500 billion
for “SIFIs” or
“large
companies”)
123

38

27

6

This proposed increase would not only provide needed relief to
those at the lower end of the current threshold but also, to those banks
that have between $50 and $100 billion in assets.110 Approximately
thirty-eight percent of the companies that currently automatically classify
as SIFIs would fall in the new midsize company classification of $20
billion to $100 billion.111 Under current DFAST rules, an entity like

109. This is a chart using the listing of banks and bank holding companies to determine
how many companies would be categorized as SIFIs or midsize companies under current
DFAST rule, Shelby’s proposal, and this Note’s proposal. It may not reflect the banks that
have actually been through DFAST as these asset totals are current through September 2015
and DFAST results were solicited and released earlier in 2015. Reports of Leading Domestic
Financial/Bank Holding Companies, supra note 107; Financial Reports of Leading Banks,
supra note 107; Financial Reports of Leading Thrifts, supra note 107; Financial Reports of
Leading Credit Unions, supra note 107.
110. Reports of Leading Domestic Financial/Bank Holding Companies, supra note 107;
Financial Reports of Leading Banks, supra note 107; Financial Reports of Leading Thrifts,
supra note 107; Financial Reports of Leading Credit Unions, supra note 107.
111. To arrive at thirty-eight percent, I obtained rankings (current as of Sept. 30, 2015) by
assets of bank holding companies, banks, thrifts, and credit unions. I then calculated the
number of companies within the $50 – $100 billion range that would no longer automatically
qualify as SIFIs under this Note’s proposal and divided it by the total number of companies
that would automatically be SIFIs under the current scheme (17/44=38%). The numbers used
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Zions Bancorp, a company with approximately $58 billion in total assets,
is subject to the same degree of testing as JPMorgan Chase, a company
with nearly forty times as many assets.112 With this new proposal, Zions
Bancorp would be more appropriately classified with institutions that do
not differ so drastically in asset size.113
As will be discussed in the following section, correctly
determining what constitutes a midsize company is not the only change
that could improve DFAST.114 Midsize companies could be sorted into
DFAST tiers based on the riskiness of their activities. 115 Each midsize
company could be placed into one of three tiers based on their individual
risk profile and accordingly, be subject to DFAST in a manner that is
proportionate to their overall risk in the event of an economic
downturn.116
This Note’s proposed range would relieve many of the smallest
DFAST companies from testing, so that they could avoid regulation and
instead, focus on efficiently serving their customers. 117 As mentioned,
this proposal would also allow federal regulators some discretion in
categorizing financial companies in the $50 billion to $100 billion range
based on the specific risks they present to the economy.118 The new range
by itself would be a significant improvement, but an additional layer of
classification could further correct the deficiencies of the current DFAST
format.119
may not reflect the banks that have actually been through DFAST as these asset totals are
current through September 2015 and DFAST results were solicited and released earlier in
2015. Reports of Leading Domestic Financial/Bank Holding Companies, supra note 107;
Financial Reports of Leading Banks, supra note 107; Financial Reports of Leading Thrifts,
supra note 107; Financial Reports of Leading Credit Unions, supra note 107.
112. See Reports of Leading Domestic Financial/Bank Holding Companies, supra note
107 (using a ranking of bank holding companies by assets to compare the assets held by Zions
Bancorp, around $58 billion, with the assets held by JPMorgan Chase, around $2.4 trillion).
113. See id. (using the ranking by assets to see that Zions Bancorp would be placed among
institutions that have somewhat similar asset totals in this Note’s proposal, unlike the current
system).
114. See infra Part V.B.
115. See infra Part V.B.
116. See infra Part V.C.
117. See Press Release, Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5 (highlighting how midsize
companies are not currently serving their local communities as much as they would like
because of high DFAST costs).
118. See Kupiec, supra note 102 (detailing the general idea contained in Shelby’s bill, and
this note, that the Fed should have the power to designate certain companies as SIFIs that do
not automatically qualify as SIFIs by their asset totals).
119. See generally Ted Peters, These Regulatory Changes Would Give Small Banks

378
B.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 20

Achieving Variation in DFAST Testing: A New Proposal

As explained previously, one of the major takeaways from the
first publicly disclosed stress tests for midsize companies was that the
individual risk that each company presented to the market was not
adequately accounted for in their company-run tests.120 This, along with
the lack of rewards for strong performance in previous testing cycles, has
created a testing system that imposes regulations and compliance costs
that may not appropriately represent each company’s risk profile.121 To
add the necessary variation to the DFAST framework, federal regulators
could evaluate banks within the midsize range on a number of factors to
determine the frequency of DFAST.122 Among the possible factors to
consider are: CAMELS ratings, how the midsize companies performed
in previous DFAST cycles, and current market factors that affect specific
risks associated with individual company activities.123
The CAMELS rating system is used to evaluate banks on their
capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and
sensitivity to interest rate risk.124 Each bank is given a composite score
made up of ratings in each of the aforementioned categories, with a rating
of “one” representing the lowest level of supervisory concern, and a
rating of “five” representing the highest level of supervisory concern.125
Banks’ CAMELS ratings are kept private from the general public because
of fears that a poor score will cause depositors to panic.126 Because of
the importance of the anonymity of CAMELS ratings—tiers and DFAST
results would be publicly available under this proposal—and the

Breathing
Room,
AM.
BANKER,
July
20,
2015
at
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/these-regulatory-changes-would-give-smallbanks-breathing-room-1075468-1.html (supporting a tiered approach to DFAST frequency
that focuses on bank rating).
120. Mustafa, supra note 5.
121. See Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5 (discussing the problems of midsize companies
not getting tested at a level that corresponds to their risk to the market).
122. See generally Peters, supra note 119 (supporting a tiered approach to DFAST
frequency that focuses on bank rating).
123. See generally id. (advocating for a tiered classification system for midsize companies
to determine testing frequency that uses strong CAMELS ratings as a main factor).
124. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE
ACTIVITIES 571–75 (4th ed. 2011).
125. Id. at 571.
126. Joe Adler, Why Camels Aren’t as Secret as You Think, AM. BANKER, Aug. 12, 2011
at 1 (explaining the rational for CAMELS rating anonymity).
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importance of the other factors to be discussed, this measure cannot be
the sole means of sorting companies into testing frequency tiers.127
The current DFAST framework does not consider past
performance, which leaves high-performing companies testing at the
same frequency as their low-performing counterparts.128 To “reward”
those who have previously demonstrated prudent capital management
and to more closely monitor those who have failed to do so, the Fed could
look at whether each company adequately prepared for and performed
well during the previous DFAST cycle. The Fed could use these results,
in conjunction with market factors and each company’s CAMELS rating,
to determine the appropriate frequency of future testing.
Notably, before midsize companies can be broken up into
different tiers, there would need to be a base year of testing from which
to proceed. This base year, which would occur in the year after this
Note’s proposal, would provide midsize companies an initial opportunity
to perform well and be sorted into a favorable tier. Because previous
years may not have yielded the most accurate DFAST results due to the
lack of adequate accounting of idiosyncratic risk, this base test would
require the Fed to increase its scrutiny of each financial company’s
testing process to ensure testing is done properly. 129 This first testing
cycle may be onerous because of the extent to which the Fed would be
involved, but it would set the stage for a right-sized DFAST framework
moving forward, thereby ensuring that the economy would run more
efficiently.130
C.

Three DFAST Tiers for the New Midsize Company Range: Tier
One

Tier One DFAST companies would be the least susceptible to
another sudden economic downturn, and would thus be tested on the least
127. See id. (stating the importance of CAMELS rating anonymity because of the fear
that the release of rating would cause bank runs).
128. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2012) (providing that institutions within the midsize and large
asset ranges will be tested at the same frequency each year).
129. See generally Mustafa, supra note 5 (detailing the ineffectiveness and the failure of
the first round of publicly disclosed DFAST results due to the lack of accounting for
idiosyncratic risk).
130. See generally Peters, supra note 119 (supporting a tiered approach to DFAST that
focuses on bank rating).
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frequent basis. In order to qualify for Tier One, companies would first
have to properly account for idiosyncratic risk in the previous DFAST,
as well as perform strongly on the tailored tests. Either a lack of test
customization or poor performance on the test would deny companies a
chance for Tier One classification. Next, Tier One companies would
need to have an extremely strong CAMELS rating. 131 This means that
Tier One companies would typically need to have a composite rating in
the top twenty percent of all tested midsize companies.132
The last requirement for qualifying as a Tier One company is that
current market conditions, as evaluated by the Fed, cannot be such that
they impact the company’s specific business activities. For example, if a
company is highly concentrated in specific asset classes or markets it
would probably not be eligible for Tier One. This would be the case even
if it performed well on the previous DFAST cycle and has excellent
CAMELS ratings. Fed discretion in determining whether market
conditions favor a company may be frustrating for many, because it is out
of each company’s control, but there needs to be some flexibility to
account for volatile market conditions.
Starting from the base test year, Tier One companies would be
subject to DFAST every two years, which is a long time in between test
cycles, but it is the reason that the requirements to qualify as a Tier One
company are so stringent.133 Tier One companies would present very
little, if any, risk to the stability of the economy and this would be
reflected in reduced testing.
D.

Tier Two

Tier Two is the category into which most companies would fall.
Companies in this category would conduct their next tests eighteen
months after the base DFAST cycle proposed in this Note. These
companies would be considered to present higher risk to the economy
than Tier One companies but at the same time, would not be considered
to inhabit an extremely precarious position.

131. See generally id. (advocating for a tiered classification system for midsize companies
to determine testing frequency that uses strong CAMELS ratings as a main factor).
132. See generally id.
133. See generally id. (advocating for a tiered classification system that tests the highest
performing midsize companies every two years).
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The composite CAMELS rating for Tier Two companies should
be around the average CAMELS rating of the tested midsize
companies.134 On top of having an average CAMELS rating, Tier Two
companies typically would have achieved the previous cycle’s
requirements but not to the degree that a Tier One company performed
on previous DFAST cycles. Also, market conditions cannot be such that
gravely impact their specific business operations or risks.
This tier may seem somewhat vague and flexible, but that is for
good reason; it is meant to contain the majority of the midsize companies
to be tested under DFAST. Testing midsize companies that present a
small risk to the economy every year seems excessive when, in the
aggregate, they make up a relatively small market share.135 A reasonable
compromise that does not impose high annual compliance costs on the
average performing midsize company, yet still provides the regulatory
oversight intended by DFAST, is testing every eighteen months.
E.

Tier Three

Tier Three, the final DFAST testing tier, would test companies
annually after the base year, and would be comprised of those companies
most susceptible to another economic downturn. Tier Three companies
would typically have a CAMELS rating in the bottom twenty percent of
the tested midsize companies’ CAMELS ratings and would have
struggled to meet the standards of customization and performance in the
previous cycle. The majority of the midsize companies will avoid this
classification and not be subject to high yearly compliance costs. The
companies that warrant increased oversight, however, will be checked
annually in an effort to improve their resilience.
VI. CONCLUSION
DFAST, though a worthwhile regulatory measure that helps
ensure that the financial industry is prepared for sudden adverse
economic conditions, has certain inefficiencies that could use

134. See generally id.
135. See MID-SIZE BANK COAL. OF AM., supra note 12 (highlighting the small market share

that midsize companies control).
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adjustment.136 Optimizing the DFAST framework will alleviate burdens
on midsize companies, while still achieving the objective of maintaining
economic preparedness and stability. The current midsize range of $10
to $50 billion in assets forces companies that have minimal impact on the
national economy to second-guess growth, which distracts attention from
the communities they serve.137 Additionally, although DFAST attempts
to account for the individual risks financial companies present to the
economy, such variation is simply not occurring in practice.138 The result
is that companies engaging in low-risk banking activities are tested at the
same frequency, and, consequently, are likely incurring relatively similar
costs as those that are engaging in risky investment markets.139
However, these negative DFAST effects can be solved by
adjusting the threshold for midsize financial company qualification and
by adequately accounting for companies’ risk profiles. This Note’s
proposed range of $20 billion to $100 billion would provide relief to a
large portion of smaller midsize companies, which are currently subject
to the onerous DFAST rules and provide them more opportunity for
unfettered growth.140 Furthermore, sorting midsize companies into tiers
after considering each company’s CAMELS ratings, its past
performance, and market factors, would account for the idiosyncratic
practices across the widened range of midsize companies and ensure that
midsize companies would be tested at a frequency that matches the risk
they present to the economy. The proposed changes would allow
companies that are not systemically significant to focus their resources
on increasing the return for their shareholders and serving the

136. See Sparks, supra note 3 (looking at how difficult it is for some midsize companies
to handle the compliance costs of DFAST but also acknowledging how much DFAST has
helped stabilize and improve banks); see also Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5 (highlighting
the issue of midsize companies sacrificing to comply with DFAST instead of providing more
services and credit to their local communities).
137. See Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5.
138. Mustafa, supra note 5.
139. See id. (discussing the lack in midsize testing variation in the first round of publicly
released midsize DFAST); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2012) (providing that companies with over
$50 billion in assets will be tested each year, regardless of their previous DFAST
performance).
140. See Dodd-Frank (“Dodd-Frank”) § 165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (requiring institutions
with over $10 billion in assets to conduct DFAST); see also Sparks, supra note 3 (looking at
how difficult it is for some midsize companies to handle the compliance costs of DFAST but
also acknowledging how much DFAST has helped stabilize and improve banks).
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communities in which they operate.141
DFAST no doubt provides increased stability to the economy, but
it is also may be flawed in the way it burdens companies that pose very
little risk to the national economy. 142 However, with an upward shift to
the midsize threshold and forced tailoring of the tests to fit midsize
companies’ risk profiles, the banking industry, as well as the national
economy, would run more efficiently, and Dodd-Frank’s goals of
increased economic stability and preparedness would be more fully
realized.143
JAMES F. POWERS III

141. See Press Release, Reg’l Bank Coal., supra note 5 (highlighting how the current
DFAST format forces compliance costs on midsize companies that force them to divert
resources from the communities they serve to compliance); see also Weinberger, supra note
51 (examining the importance of increased compliance costs under DFAST and how that
plays into institutions’ decisions).
142. See Sparks, supra note 3.
143. See Presidential Remarks, supra note 1 (discussing Dodd-Franks goals of economic
stability and the prevention of another economic catastrophe like the Crisis).

